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CRIMINAL LAW OF

PUNISHMENT

DEFENDANT

TO

POWER OF COURT TO IMPOSE PARTICULAR KINDS
TRIAL COURT HAD POWER TO ORDER
MAKE

RESTITUTION

TO

SURVIVORS

OF

AUTO

ACCIDENT TO COMPENSATE THEM FOR THEIR INJURIES

Karl Morgan was intoxicated when he was involved in an
automobile collision that killed Mr. and Mrs. Clarkin and seriously
injured three girls riding with them.' The State of Montana
charged and convicted Morgan of negligent homicide. 2 The trial
court ordered Morgan to make restitution to the accident survivors
in accordance with section 46-18-201 of the Montana Code
Annotated. 3 On appeal Morgan challenged 4 the trial court's
Karl
, -. 646 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982). The 'lt-ndani,
Mon. 1. State v. Morgan, Morgan, drank several alcoholic beverages at a Bozeman bar and then started home. Brief fr
, 646 P.2d 1177 (1982). A few miles from the
Mont. Respondent at 2, State v. Morgan, bar Morgan drove his car over the centerline and collided with Holly Clarkin's car. Brief at 2-3. Karl
Morgan was hospitalized for the injuries he suffered. Id. at 1.
Mont. at 646 P.2d at 1178. On January 8, 1981, a jury convicted Karl Morgan ol
2. __
negligent homicide pursuant to § 45-5-104 of the Montana Code Annotated. Brieflbr Respondent at
-. , 646 P.2d 1177 (1982). See MONT. Com. ANN. S 45-5-104
Mont.
1, State v. Morgan, (1981). Section 45-5-104 describes the crime of negligent homicide as follows: "Criminal homicide
constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently." Id. § 45-5-104(1).
, 646 P.2d at 1182. The trial court deferred sentencing of the delndant
-_ Mont. at 3.
for three years under the conditions that he serve 60 days in jail on a work release program and make
payments to the accident survivors. Id. The trial court ordered Morgan to make payments to the
clerk of the district court in the amount of $75.00 each month for three years. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-201 (1981). Section 46-18-201, which specifies the types of sentences that a district court
may impose, provides:
1. Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offinse upon a verdict or a plea
of guilty, the court may:
he sentencing judge may impose upon the
a. defer imposition of sentence .....
defendant any reasonable restrictions or conditions during the period of the
deferred imposition. Such reasonable restrictions or conditions may include:
iv. restitution.
(1) (a) (iv). -_,
Id. § 46-18-201
Mont. at
4.

646 P.2d at 1178. Morgan raised two other issues on appeal.

496

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

59:495

jurisdiction and power to order restitution to the accident
survivors.A Morgan further argued that the injured girls were not
within the class of persons injured by the crime of negligent
homicide. 6 The Supreme Court of Montana held that the trial court
had power to order restitution 7 in the form of payment of the outof-pocket losses, 8 but that payment in excess of actual damages was
not permissible. 9 The court also held that the survivors of the
collision were within the class of persons injured by the crime, 10 and
therefore, the trial court properly ordered restitution." State v.
646 P.2d 1177 (1982).
Morgan, -Mont.-,
Criminal law statutes often provide for restitution as either a
3
condition of probation 12 or as a separate sentencing alternative.'
Mont. at -. , 646 P.2d at 1179-80. The first issue was whether Morgan was in a condition
646
rendering him incapable of withdrawing his implied consent for a blood alcohol test. Id. at __,
P.2d at 1179. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1981) (Montana's implied consent law on chemical
blood, breath, or urine tests). The second issue involved the effect on the fairness of the proceedings
of the prosecutor's illegal jury instruction regarding the presumed level of intoxication in Montana.
_. Mont. at -. , 646 P.2d at 1180.
..
646 P.2d 1177, 1182
Mont...
5. Brief for Appellant at 13-14, State v. Morgan, (1982). Morgan argued that the definition of restitution did not include payment in the nature of
civil damages, but contemplated only the restoration of an object wrongfully taken, or its money's
worth, by reason of a defendant's wrongful act. Brief at 13-14. Morgan contended that the district
court's order requiring him to pay the surviving victims was not restitution, but was in the nature of
civil damages. Id. at 14. Therefore, Morgan concluded that the district court had exceeded its
jurisdiction and sentencing power. Id.
Mont. at __, 646 P.2d at 1182. Morgan based his argument on State v. Stalheim. Id.
6. __
552 P.2d 829, 832 (1976). Section 137.540 of the Oregon
See State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, __,
Revised Statutes provides that a defendant shall make "restitution to the aggrieved party." OR.
REv. STAT. § 137.540 (1981). In Stalkeim the Supreme Court of Oregon construed "aggrieved party"
to mean the direct victim of the crime and not other persons who suffered loss because of the victim's
552 P.2d at 832.
death or injury. 275 Or. at-,
7. -. Mont. at __ , 646 P.2d at 1182. The Montana court followed the trend of criminal
sanctions in the United States by providing for the use of restitution in cases in which a court defers
imposition of sentence. Id.
8. Id. at __, 646 P.2d at 1183. The Morgan court held that medical expenses were an out-ofpocket loss. Id.
9. Id. Because the record from the district court did not show the actual damages caused to each
of the survivors, the Supreme Court of Montana was not able to determine whether the restitution
had exceeded the actual damages. Id. Thus, the court vacated that portion of the sentence that
required payment of money and remanded to the district court for resentencing on that point. Id.
10. Id. The Morgan court stated that § 46-18-201 of the Montana Code Annotated, which
provides for restitution, failed to aid the court in construing the meaning of the phrase "the class of
__

persons injured by the crime." Id. (quoting 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE § 18.114-.115 (2d ed. 1980)). Therefore, the Morgan court looked to the Crime Victims
Compensation Act of Montana and found that under § 53-9-103 of the Act "a person who has
suffered as a result of criminally injurious conduct is classed as a victim, without a relationship to a
Mont. -. , 646 P.2d at 1183. See MONT. CODE
crime for which a conviction was obtained. "
ANN. § 53-9-103 (1981).

646 P.2d 1177, 1183 (1982). The Morgan court
Mont .....
11. State v. Morgan, considered the three surviving girls to be persons injured by the crime because each of the girls
suffered bodily harm due to Morgan's criminal act of negligent homicide. Id.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). Section 3651, which governs suspension of sentence and
probation after a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or imprisonment,
provides that "while on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant may be required
to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense
for which conviction was had." Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07 (2) (e) (1975) (As a
condition of probation the court may order the defendant to "make restitution.., to the victim of his
conduct for the damage or injury which was sustained.").
13. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32"02 (1975). Section 12.1-32-02 sets forth sentencing
alternatives, including restitution for damages resulting from the commission of an offense. See id.
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Courts traditionally have used the terms "restitution" and
"reparation" interchangeably. 14 The Supreme Court of Oregon in
State v. Stalheim, 15 however, construed "restitution" to mean "the
return of a sum of money, an object, or the value of an object" that
the defendant wrongfully acquired during the perpetration of the
crime. 16 The Stalheim court defined "reparation" to be "a repairing
17
or ...[a] restoration to good condition."
Case law has established that a claimant must be within the
class of persons injured by the crime to be eligible to receive
restitution.1 8 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Follette1 9 held that when
restitution is a condition of probation, the trial court can order the
defendant to make payment to an "aggrieved party. "20 The Follette
court limited the application of restitution by defining the phrase
"aggrieved party or parties" to include only those individuals who
are "directly and financially aggrieved by the criminal acts of the
21
defendants."
22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Karrell v. United States
also limited the concept of restitution by requiring that the
23
indictment name the claimant to have a proper restitution order.
Under this section the trial court must convict the defendant of the offense. Id. See also MONT. CODE'
ANN. 5 46-18-201 (1981) (restitution is listed among the types of sentences that the trial courts may
impose).
14. See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3D976 (1977) (discusses the propriety of a probation
v1ndition that requires that defi'ndant convicted of a violent crime to make reparation to the injured
\%ititl).

15. 275 Or. 683, 552 P.2d 829 (1976). The Oregon Supreme Court held that § 137.540 (10) of
the Oregon Revised Statutes, which authorizes the imposition of restitution or reparation as a
coldition of probation, allowed restitution to the direct victim only. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683,
-,
552 P.2d 829, 833 (1976). The court restricted recovery to sums that were readily measurable.
id.
16. Id. at-,
552 P.2d at 832.
17. Id. The Stalheim court construed "reparation" to encompass only reimbursement for the
victim's liquidated or easily measurable damages resulting from the charged offense. Id. It embraced
such damages as medical expenses, wages actually lost, and reimbursement for easily measurable
property damages. Id.
18. See Morgan, Mont. at -, 646 P.2d at 1182 (quoting 3 AMERICAN BAR AssocIATON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 18.114-. 115 (2d ed. 1980)).
19. 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1940). The defendant pleaded guilty to charges of embezzlement
and conversion. United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 953-54 (E.D. Pa. 1940). The trial court
suspended her sentence and placed her on probation on the condition that she make restitution to the
surety who covered the amount embezzled. Id. at 954.
20. Id. The federal district court decided that the phrase "aggrieved party or parties" included
"'such persons as the owner of the contents of a letter stolen from the mail, the person defrauded by a
scheme involving the use of the mails, the bank from which funds have been embezzled, and the
innocent person to whom a counterfeit note has been passed." Id. at 955.
21. Id. at 955. While the Follette court did limit restitution to direct victims, it found that the
phrase "aggrieved party or parties" included parties other than the United States Government. Id.
The use of both singular and plural forms in the phrase "aggrieved party or parties" contained in 18
U.S.C. § 724 persuaded the court that the United States alone was not intended. Id. at 954-55
(construing 18 U.S.C. § 724 (1940), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1952), current version al 18
U.S.C. 5 3651 (1976 & Supp.V 1981)).
22. 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950). In interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3651, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found from the statutory language an underlying congressional intent to restrict the scope of
restitution. Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1950).
23. Id at 986-87.
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Moreover, the Karrell court held that the trial court must convict
the defendant on the indictment count for restitution to be
proper.2 4 The Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. King2 5 strictly
construed the term "victim" in section 16-11-204.5 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes 26 to exclude those who "suffer loss
because of some relationship, contractual or otherwise, to the
directly aggrieved party. "27 Thus, the Follette, Karrel, and King
courts limited the applicability of restitution to the situation in
which the trial court convicts the defendant of an offense and the
loss sustained by the victims or aggrieved parties is a direct result of
28
the criminal act.
29
The Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Gunderson
expanded the class of "aggrieved parties" to include the parents of
a deceased child. 30 The Gunderson court held that it was appropriate
for the trial court to require the defendant to reimburse any person
who has suffered loss or damage because of the commission of the
crime. 31 Further expansion of the applicability of restitution in
criminal sentencing occurred when the Oregon Supreme Court in
State v. Dillon32 noted that the Oregon Legislature had reacted to
Stalheim by extending the class of "aggrieved parties" beyond
24. Id. The trial court in Karrellconvicted the defendant for knowingly issuing false certificates
and papers relating to claims for veterans' home loan guaranty benefits. Id. at 982-83. On appeal the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the record contained substantial evidence in
support of the jury's guilty verdict, the trial court erroneously had ordered restitution for losses
sustained by any veteran other than those directly interested in the counts upon which the court
convicted the defendant. Id. at 986-87.
25.
- Colo. App. -. , 648 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982). The Colorado Court of Appeals held
that an insurance company was not a "victim" within the meaning of § 16-11-204.5 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes. People v. King, -_ Colo. App..,..,
648 P.2d 173, 175 (Ct. App. 1982).
26. Id. at -,
648 P.2d at 174 (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-204.5(1) (Supp. 1982)).
Section 16-11-204.5(1) provides: "As a condition of every sentence to probation, the court shall
provide that the defendant make restitution to the victim of his conduct for the actual damages which
were sustained." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-204.5(1) (Supp. 1982).
27.
-. Colo. App. at -, 648 P.2d at 175. It was the view of the Colorado Court of Appeals
that restitution was not a substitute for a civil action. Id.
28. Karrell, 181 F.2d at 987 (trial court erred in awarding restitution to veterans other than those
directly concerned in counts upon which the defendant was convicted); Follette, 32 F. Supp. at 954
(restitution as a condition of probation could be awarded only to an "aggrieved party" for "actual
damages"); King, Colo. App. at , 648 P.2d at 175 (restitution awarded only to parties
immediately and directly aggrieved by a criminal act).
29. 74 Wash. 2d 226, 444 P.2d 156 (1968). The trial court in Gunderson convicted the defendant
of negligent homicide arising from a traffic accident and ordered him to pay $7,500 as restitution to
the parents of the deceased child. State v. Gunderson, 74 Wash. 2d 226,
-. , 444 P.2d 156, 159-60
(1968).
30. Id. at __, 444 P.2d at 160. The Supreme Court of Washington construed § 9.95.210 of the
Revised Code ofWashington. Id. Section 9.95.210 permits a court to require the defendant to make
restitution "to any person or persons who may have suffered loss or damage by reason of the
commission of the crime in question." WASH. REV. CODF § 9.95.210 (1974).
31. 74 Wash. 2d at , 444 P.2d at 160. The Gunderson court noted that "certainly the
defendant does not argue that the parents of the deceased child did not suffer a loss." Id.
32. 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1981). The Oregon Supreme Court in Dillon held that a trial
court may properly order restitution when the loss is a result of the defendant's criminal activities for
which he is convicted and is an item for which the defendant may be liable in a civil action. State v.
Dillon, 292 Or. 172,-,
637 P.2d 602, 608 (1981).

1983]

CASE COMMENT

direct victims.

33

499

The Dillon court recognized that those who are

"legally responsible for the pecuniary damage of victims," such as
insurance companies and parents of injured family members, are
also injured, and thus, they are "aggrieved parties." ' 34 Thus,
Washington and Oregon have expanded the applicability of
restitution by defining "aggrieved parties" or "victims" to include
those who are legally responsible for the cost of the damage or
35
injury caused by the defendant.
A second well-recognized restriction on the use of restitution is
that the ordered amount shall not exceed the actual damages or loss
caused by the offender. 36 The Eire County Court of New York
State in People v. Funk37 addressed the issue of how much restitution
a court properly could order the defendant to pay.3 8 The court in
Funk held that it is proper for a trial court to order restitution in any
amount except to the extent that it exceeds the "actual losses or
damages" caused by the defendant's offense. 39 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Landay40 held that the rule that
limits the restitution amount to counts upon which the trial court
convicted the defendant41 eliminates any doubt about when the
33. Id. at -_, 637 P.2d at 605 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 137.103(4) (1981)). Section 137.103(4)
provides that the term "victim means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activites." OR. REv. STAT. § 137.103(4) (1981).
34. 292 Or. at -, 637 P.2d at 605. The Dillon court quoted § 137.103(2)-(3) of the Oregon
Revised Statutes, which provides the following definitions:
(2) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which
a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and shall include, but not be
limited to, the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise
harmed, and losses such as medical expenses.
(3) "Restitution" means full, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to a
victim.
OR,REv. STAT. 5 137.103(2)-(3) (198 1).

-, 637 P.2d 602, 606 (1981) (construing OR. REv. STAT.
35. State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172,
_. 444 P.2d 156, 160 (1968) (trial
137.103 (4) (1981)); State v. Gunderson, 74 Wash. 2d 226,
court properly ordered defendant to make restitution payments to parents ofdeceased child).
646 P.2d at 1182 (quoting 3 AMIERICAN BAR AssocIATIo.N
Mont. at -,
36. See Morgan. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18.115 (2d ed. 1980)). For an example of a federal statute that
linits restitution to actual damages. see 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37.117 Misc. 778, 193 N.Y.S. 302 (Eire County Ct. 1921). The Eire County Court in Funk held
that the trial court could not require the defendant, convicted of one petit larceny in the amount of
S3.80. to make restitution for any amount greater than S3.80. People v. Funk, 117 Misc. 778,.,
193 N.Y.S. 302. 303 (Eire County Ct. 1921).
,. 193 N.Y.S. at 303. At the trial the court charged the appellant with one count of
38. Id. at
193 N.Y.S. at 302. The court found the
petit larceny in the sum of S3.80. 117 Misc. at _.
defendant guilty, placed him on probation. and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of
S1.500. Id.
39. Id. at-..
193 N.Y.S. at 303.
40. 513 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1975). The trial court convicted the defendant of the crime of
transporting forged securities in interstate commerce. United States v. Landay. 513 F.2d 306. 307
(5th Cir. 1975). A condition of probation was that the defendant immediately execute documents
necessary to make restitution of the amounts fraudulently obtained. Id.
41. Id. at 308. The Landay court cited 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651. which provides that the defendant
"Imlay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss
caused by the offense for which conviction %%as had." Id. at 308 n.5. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651 (Supp.
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amount of restitution has been repaid and avoids the possibility of
postsentencing disagreement between the parties about the
amount the defendant must pay. 42 Thus, the Funk and Landay
courts found that restitution is proper in the amount upon which
the trial court convicts the defendant, but that restitution shall not
43
exceed the actual damages or losses caused by the wrongdoer.
Case law also has established that restitution is a viable
remedy only when the defendant is able to pay. 4 4 In People v.
Cunningham45 the Criminal Court of the City of New York held that
restitution is inappropriate when the defendant lacks the ability to
pay and his financial condition is such that a civil judgment against
him would be incapable of satisfaction because of indigency.4 6 The
issue of a defendant's ability to pay also was presented in State v.
Dillon.4 7 The Oregon Supreme Court explained that restitution is
not intended to be the equivalent of a civil award of damages and
that the trial court must consider the defendant's ability to pay the
restitution ordered. 48 The Dillon court also noted that the theory of
restitution is penological because it is intended to assist
rehabilitative and deterrent purposes by causing a defendant to
realize the relationship between his criminal offense and the
damage suffered by the victim. 4 9 Thus, the Cunningham and Dillon
courts followed the principle that a trial court must consider the
1982).
42. Landay, 513 F.2d at 308. The Landay court noted that the disagreement between the parties
did not involve the amount of restitution, but only the method of making restitution. Id. At the time
of sentencing, the trial judge relied on a consent judgment in which the defendant freely and
voluntarily admitted the exact amount that the bank claimed he owed. Id. The Landay court found
that there was no question that the amount of the consent judgment was the amount of restitution
that the trialjudge considered in fixing the condition ofprobation. Id.
43. Id. at 308 (although the probation order failed to state that it was limited to "actual
damages," the court found that the parties did not disagree on the amount of restitution, but only on
193 N.Y.S. at 303 (trial court could
the method of making restitution); Funk, 117 Misc. at -,
not require the defendant to make restitution of more than the amount taken in the larceny for which
the court convicted the defendant).
44. See, e.g., People v. Knowles, 92 Ill. App. 3d 537, -,
414 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (App. Ct.
1980) (Although a statutory provision on restitution did not condition restitution on the defendant's
ability to pay, the Knowles court held that amounts had to be "reasonable and just.").
45. 106 Misc. 2d 326, 431 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Grim. Ct. 1980). The Cunningham court held that
renewal of prosecution for failure of the indigent defendant to make restitution was improper. People
v. Cunningham, 106 Misc. 2d 326_ _,
431 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (Grim. Ct. 1980).
46. Id. at -, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The Legal Aid Society represented the defendants, and
one ofthe defendants was dependent on public assistance. Id.
47. 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1981). The trial court convicted the defendant of assault,
reckless endangerment, criminal mischief, and driving under revocation of his license. State v.
637 P.2d 602, 604 (1981). On appeal the Dillon court held that the trial
Dillon, 292 Or. 172, -,
court properly ordered restitution based on damage sustained by two patrol cars, one of which was
hit by police gunfire and the other by the defendant's car. Id. at __,
637 P.2d at 608-09.
48. Id. at -,
637 P.2d at 607. The Dillon court noted that numerous civil law concepts are
incorporated into the restitution process, but those incorporated concepts do not transform a
criminal sanction into civil compensation. Id. These concepts do have the important function in a
criminal proceeding of restricting the trial court's restitution authority "to what would otherwise be
special damages recoverable in civil proceedings by specified persons or entities." Id.
49. Id. The Dillon court noted that restitution in criminal law is penal in nature, while in civil
law the emphasis in restitution is on compensating the injured party. Id.
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defendant's ability to pay, his other obligations, the burden a
restitution order will impose upon him, and the rehabilitative effect
50
of a restitution order.
In State v. Morgan5 V the issue was twofold: whether the
recipients of the restitution payments were "aggrieved parties,'"52
and if so, whether the district court had ordered the proper amount
of restitution. 5 3 The Morgan court pointed out that while section 4618-201 of the Montana Code Annotated 54 did not specifically define
"aggrieved parties," the Crime Victims Compensation Act-of
Montana 55 defined a "victim" to be "a person who suffer[ed]
bodily injury or death as a result of . . . criminally injurious
conduct.' '56 The Morgan court construed section 53-9-103 of the
Crime Victims Compensation Act of Montana to mean that a
person can be a victim "without a relationship to a crime for which
a conviction [is] obtained. ,,57 The Morgan court held that the three
surviving girls in the vehicle were within "the class of persons
injured by the crime," making restitution proper. 58
The Morgan court followed the general rule that restitution
must not exceed the actual damages. 59 Unfortunately, section 4618-201 of the Montana Code Annotated did not provide significant
guidance to the district court regarding the method that the court
should use in applying restitution or the limitations applicable in a
50. Cunningham, 106 Misc. 2d at -. , 431 N.Y.S. 2d at 787 (restitution is a viable remedy when
the defendant is able to pay); Dillon, 292 Or. at , 637 P.2d at 606 (a sentencing judge
may consider anything he would ordinarily consider at a sentencing hearing, but he must focus on
the defendant's circumstances in deciding whether to order restitution and in deciding the amount of
restitution). See OR. REv. STAT. § 137.106 (1981) (restitution is a proper sentencing alternative).
51. Mont. , 646 P.2d 1177 (1982). The Morgan court did not discuss whether
restitution was proper as a principle. State v. Morgan, Mont. -..
646 P.2d 1177, 1186
(1982). Instead the court framed the issue as whether the amount of restitution was proper under the
facts. Id. at-_., 646 P.2d at 1182.
52. Id. at-., 646 P.2d at 1186. Morgan argued that the trial court could order restitution only
to the victims of the crime charged and that only the deceased were victims of the crime of negligent
homicide. Brief for Respondent at 22, State v. Morgan, Mont. -. , 646 P.2d 1177 (1982).
53. - Mont. at -, 646 P.2d at 1186. For the amount of restitution ordered, see supra note
3.
54. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (1981).

55. See id. 5 53-9-103 (1977). Section 53-9-103 is part of the Uniform Crime Victims
Reparations Act. See

UNIF.

CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT, 11 U.L.A. 35 (1973). Minnesota,

Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, and Ohio have adopted portions of the Act. See id. (Supp. 1981).
56.
- Mont. at -, 646 P.2d at 1183 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-103 (6) (1977)).
Cf N.D. CENT. CODE

§

12.1-32-07 (e) (1975) (trial court may order restitution to victim of the

defendant's conduct).
57. - Mont. at -, 646 P.2d at 1183. The Morgan decision arguably sets forth an expansive
definition of "aggrieved parties." See id. But see United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa.
1940) (claimant must have direct concern in counts upon which the trial court convicts the
defendant).
58. - Mont. at
, 646 P.2d at 1183. For a discussion of the Morgan court's reasoning, see
supra notes 10-11.
59.

-

Mont. at.,

646 P.2d at 1183. Because the district court's findings failed to show

actual damages, the supreme court remanded the case for a determination of whether the restitution
order exceeded actual damages. Id.
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restitution situation. 60 To correct this problem the Morgan court
looked to section 3-601 of the Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act. 6 1 The court held that the district courts could order restitution
in the amount of "out-of-pocket losses for medical expenses, 62 but
not in excess of the actual money equivalent.' '63
The Morgan court held that section 46-18-232 of the Montana
Code Annotated 64 applies to restitution cases even though the
provision failed to mention restitution. 65 Section 46-18-232
provides standards for trial courts to follow in determining whether
to sentence the defendant to pay costs. 66 In adopting these
guidelines for restitution cases the Morgan court held that the
district courts must take into consideration the defendant's
financial resources in ascertaining the amount and manner of the
payment of restitution. 67 Additionally, the court held that district
courts must not sentence a defendant to pay restitution unless the
defendant is or will be able to pay the amount. 68 Finally, the
guidelines allow a defendant to petition the sentencing court for
remission of the payment of restitution or any unpaid portion
69
thereof when he is having difficulty in making the payments.
In summary, the Morgan court held that only persons who have
suffered bodily injury or death due to criminally injurious conduct
70
are eligible for restitution payments based on out-of-pocket losses.
Furthermore, the Morgan court provided guidance on the manner
in which district courts should apply restitution as a sentencing
option by directing the district courts to follow the guidelines in
71
section 46-18-232 of the Montana Code Annotated.
The Morgan decision fails to guide the district courts in
60. Id. The supreme court stated that § 46-18-201 of the Montana Code Annotated permitted
the trial court to defer imposition of sentence and order the defendant to make restitution. Id. at
-, 646 P.2d at 1182. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (1981).
61.
-_ Mont. at __
, 646 P.2d at 1183. The Montana Legislature had not adopted the
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act at the time of the Morgan decision. Mont. at -_, 646
P.2d at 1184. See MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-601, 10 U.L.A. 106 (Supp. 1982).
62.
-. Mont. at -. , 646 P.2d at 1183. In addition, the district courts could order restitution
based on payment of the money equivalent of loss resulting from property taken, destroyed, broken,
or otherwise harmed. Id. For cases concerning losses for which the trial court may order reparations,
see Dickson v. State, 230 Ark. 491, 323 S.W.2d 432 (1959) (out-of-pocket medical and hospital
expenses); State v. Behrens, 204 Neb. 785, 285 N.W.2d 513 (1979) (victim's pain and suffering
growing out of injuries received at the hands ofdefendant).
63.
-_ Mont. at-,
646 P.2d at 1183.
64. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-232 (1981).
65. Mont. at -,
646 P.2d at 1183-84. The Morgan court found that § 46-18-232
contained reasonable standards to apply to restitution payments. Id. at
-. , 646 P.2d at 1184.
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-232 (1981).
67.
-. Mont. at
, 646 P.2d at 1183-84 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-232 (1981)).
68.
-. Mont. at
, 646 P.2d at 1183 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-232 (1981)). The
Morgan court declared that the district courts must take into consideration "the nature of the
burden" imposed on the defendant by the restitution amount. Id. at __
, 646 P.2d at 1184.
69. Id. at.., 646 P.2d at 1184.
70. Id. at ..
, 646 P.2d at 1183.
71. Id. at
__, 646 P.2d at 1183-84.
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situations in which a postsentencing change in the defendant's
financial status enables him to pay a larger, more equitable sum of
restitution to the aggrieved parties. 72 The Morgan decision also fails
to address whether the husband or wife of a deceased victim in a
73
wrongful death situation may qualify as an "aggrieved party." ,
North Dakota recognizes restitution as a sentencing
alternative in section 12.1-32-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 74 The primary goal of restitution under chapter 12.1-32 is
the rehabilitation of the wrongdoer. 75 Restitution is also available
as a condition of probation under section 12.1-32-07.76 Once a
court determines that restitution should apply, section 12.1-32-08
requires the court to hold a restitution hearing to determine the
amount of damage, the ability of the defendant to pay the amount
ordered, and the rehabilitative effect of ordering restitution. 77 A
restitution award in North Dakota is limited in amount to "fruits of
the criminal offense and expenses actually incurred as a direct
result of the defendant's criminal action.' '78 Thus, the North
Dakota Legislature has provided the trial courts with the statutory
79
tools to choose and implement restitution in criminal law cases.
In 1975 the North Dakota Legislature adopted portions of the
72. See id. at -,
646 P.2d at 1184. The Morgan decision only provides for modification of a
restitution order when the defendant petitions the sentencing court because he is having difficulty in
making restitution payments. Id.
73. See id. at -,
646 P.2d at 1183. The Morgan court noted that under the Crime Victims
Compensation Act of Montana a person who has "suffered as a result of criminally injurious
conduct" is classified as a victim. Id. Nevertheless, the court failed to define specifically the
boundaries of the "aggrieved party" class. See id.
74. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02 (Supp. 1981). Section 12.1-32-02(1) (e) provides: "Every
person convicted of an offense who is sentenced by the court shall be sentenced to one or a
combination of the following alternatives, unless the sentencing alternatives are otherwise specifically
provided in the statute defining the offense: . . . Restitution for damages resulting from the
commission of the offense. "Id. § 12.1-32-02 (1) (e).
75. See id. § 12.1-32-08 (1976). Section 12.1-32-08 (1) (c) provides that the sentencing court at
the restitution hearing must consider the possibility that ordering restitution would serve a valid
rehabilitative purpose. Id. § 12.1-32-08 (1) (c).
76. See id. § 12.1-32-07 (1976). Section 12.1-32-07 (2)(e) provides:
2. When imposing a sentence to probation, the court may impose such conditions
as it deems appropriate, and may include any one or more of the following:
e. Make restitution or reparation to the victim of his conduct for the damage or
injury which was sustained, or perform other reasonable assigned work. When
restitutitn, reparation, or assigned work is a condition of the sentence, the
court shall proceed as provided in section 12.1-32-08.
Id. § 12.1-32-07 (2) (e). For a North Dakota case considering restitution as a condition of probation,
see Decker v. State, 209 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1973).
77. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-08 (1976). Section 12.1-32-08 provides that at the hearing
the court shall determine "the reasonable damages sustained by the victim or victims of the criminal
offense" and the "amount the defendant can or will be able to pay." Id. For cases in North Dakota
covering restitution hearings, see State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1978); State v.
Spiekermeier, 256 N.W.2d 877 (N.D. 1977).
78. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-08 (1976).
79. See id. ch. 12.1-32 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
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Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act.8 0 The purpose of the Act
is to assist and compensate innocent victims for their economic loss
from criminally injurious conduct. 8 1 Under the Act, however,
''criminally injurious conduct does not include conduct arising out
of the . . . use of a motor vehicle except when intended to cause

personal injury or death."182 Thus, the Act appears to be
inapplicable in the typical negligent homicide case involving a
83
drunk driver and an injured party or parties.
The North Dakota Legislature has developed general
standards that are applicable during a restitution hearing84 and
specific factors for the trial courts to consider in a sentencing
decision. 85 Nevertheless, North Dakota does not have case law
construing the statutory terms "aggrieved parties" and "actual
damages.' '86 Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
yet to outline explicit standards for trial courts to follow in ordering
restitution.
The significance of the Morgan decision to the use of restitution
in North Dakota is that the Supreme Court of Montana defined key
terms involved in the criminal law concept of restitution.8 7 The
Morgan court addressed the problems involved with determining the
"aggrieved parties," the actual damages, and the factors that the
trial courts should consider when sentencing the defendant to pay
88
restitution.

JOHN R.

SHOEMAKER

80. See Uniform Crime Reparations Act, ch. 587. 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws 1535 (codified at N.D.
CENiT. CODE ch. 65-13 (Supp. 1981)).
81. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-02 (Supp. 1981). Section 65-13-02 sets forth the legislative
purpose and intent. Id. Compensation under the Act is allowed only in "the amount of expenses
actuallv suffered as a direct result of the criminal acts of other persons. -Id,
82. Id. § 65-13-03 (4) (c).

83. See id.
84. For applicable statutes and case law on restitution hearings. see supra note 77.
85. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04 (1976) (provides factors for consideration in the
sentencing decision).
86. For North Dakota cases concerning restitution hearings and restitution as a condition of
probation. see supra notes 76-77.
87. SeeMoigan. Mont. at
. 646 P.2d at 1183-84.
88. See id.

